Debates around infrastructure tend to focus on the global North yet in the global South demand for infrastructure is huge and we see new and emergent actors engaged in finance and construction; China being preeminent among them. China's interests in the global South have grown apace over the past decade, especially in terms of accessing resources and securing infrastructure deals. The role of Chinese banks and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in financing and building the projects reveals a blurring between geopolitical and commercial interests and processes. The paper situates China's entry into the global South as part of a geopolitics that is simultaneously geoeconomic and interrogates these issues through case studies of Chinese-backed projects in Ghana and Cambodia. These projects are spatially and politically complex with China adopting a range of financing models -often including an element of resource swaps -in which bank finance is critical and marks the Chinese as different to western financiers. These international deals are secured at the political elite level and so by-pass established forms of national governance and accountability in the recipient countries, while the turnkey construction projects remain locally enclaved. The cases also show that wider developmental benefits are limited with 'ordinary' citizens -especially those in the rural areas -gaining relatively little from these major energy projects and the benefits accruing to urbanbased elites.
INTRODUCTION: INFRASTRUCTURAL FOREIGN POLICY
May 2013 saw the commissioning of Ghana's Bui hydroelectric dam which had been built by a Chinese company using a loan from one of China's state banks. At the ceremony, the Chinese Ambassador said the 'power station and many other Chinese aided projects are the vivid reflections of the long-lasting friendship between our two peoples' (Gong, 2013) . Expressions of 'friendship' between 'two peoples' reflects shifts in the global economy wherein the official discourses of both Chinese leaders and their Southern counterparts are of 'win-win' partnerships and a new era of 'South-South' cooperation. Bound up in these ideas of cooperation is a revitalized interest in infrastructure and the 'hardware' of development as opposed to the 'software' of development that many western aid agencies pushed as part of the 'postWashington' consensus.
China has emerged as a major infrastructure financier in the global South (McKinsey, 2017) and this global realignment of Southern interests opens up important questions about the modalities of this financing and the placing of such projects in the space economy of global South countries. Our paper focuses on Chinese-backed energy projects in two countries -a gas processing plant in Ghana and a hydroelectric dam in Cambodia 1 -which reflect different dynamics of how Chinese geopolitical and geoeconomic interests interface with domestic politics in low-and middle-income countries (LMICs).
In studying urban infrastructure financing much of the focus has been on the global
North where novel public-private finance initiatives are being devised (O'Neill, 2018) yet relatively little has been written on global South infrastructure financing in which the actors, mechanisms, and political relations are markedly different. In the context of urban infrastructure in the global North, literature has focused on rescaling and restructuring the local state (Ashton et al, 2016; Torrance, 2008) whereby global capital flows play into local circuits of economic and political power, and urban governments become increasingly entrepreneurial. Where we depart from these accounts is not to focus on the local state per se where the urban infrastructure is being built, but to examine China's external projection of state power in enabling infrastructure financing and construction.
The paper asks how is China's geoeconomic and geopolitical power projected via infrastructure projects, through what territorial forms does this occur, and what role does elite agency in recipient states play in shaping the outcomes? We start by arguing that China's geopolitical ambitions are also geoeconomic and that the country's hybrid state/private enterprises are ideally suited for infrastructure initiatives which combine state-backed finance with relatively closed tendering of construction contracts. Second, these geoeconomic initiatives operate through complex territorialisations that enfold both state and non-state spaces. The contracting and financing of these infrastructure projects are brokered between state elites and are, to a large extent, enclaved spatially and institutionally. Despite this apparent enclaving these projects also transcend scales through various material and social networks, including diplomacy, supply chains, and transmission lines. These networks link non-urban sites of energy production with urban sites of consumption which blurs the distinction between urban/non-urban spaces. Third, the geographies of these initiatives are not solely driven by Chinese interests since they interface with 'host' countries. The interaction between Chinese state-backed actors and the agency of Southern political elites shapes how infrastructure is financed, funded, and utilized which are ultimately questions of 'who benefits?'
The next section expands on these three theoretical claims around geoeconomics, territory and agency. Then we examine China's internationalization and the institutions through which this happens. Next we look at the broad patterns of demand for infrastructure investment in LMICs before turning to two case studies to unpack the territorial dynamics of major infrastructure projects in Ghana and Cambodia and the role of domestic political agency.
THEORISING INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH
These concerns with South-South infrastructure projects build on a broader recognition that geopolitics is also simultaneously geoeconomic, but in the case of China this takes a particular form based on hybrid state-market enterprises. These projects generate specific forms of territory that are simultaneously localized and transnationalised, while domestic political agency shapes how benefits are distributed. Cowen and Smith (2009) argue that the geoeconomic 'recasts rather than replaces geopolitical calculation' (p.25). Through US hegemony and a market logic they argue, 'geoeconomics has come to provide a new disciplining architecture replacing the geopolitical mechanisms of colonial administration…(in which)…The acquisition or control of territory is not at all irrelevant, but is a tactical option rather than a strategic necessity ' (p.40 & 42) . Specifically, '(T)he rise of geoeconomics does not necessarily mean that boundaries and territories become less important, but their strict national articulation may ' (p.43) . With fixed investments in things like power plants, oil wells, and dams territorial control is still a necessity rather than a 'tactical' option, and requires the 'host' state to grant access rights. This accessibility issue necessarily requires an analysis of the political agency of these countries given that this is fundamentally about distributing the costs and benefits of such investments.
Geoeconomics
Such rethinking of the geopolitical has largely been used to examine security issues and border-making in the aftermath of 9/11 so while it focuses on Southern actors it is only as they relate to a Euro-American power axis and has not been used to analyse new 'South-South' engagements. With regards to China's geoeconomic strategy Bach (2016) described it as having an 'infrastructural foreign policy' in which infrastructure is a major export product and 'the visibility of Chinese infrastructure financing is central to its global image'. Not only has China lead in setting up new multilateral development banks, but the 'Belt and Road' initiative devised under Xi
Jinping is an ambitious programme, which official discourses claim will eventually connect 60 countries through infrastructural initiatives (PWC, 2016) .
Territory
In the cases of energy infrastructure that we examine, the control of territory is increasingly through enclaves (Mohan, 2013) . Speaking of resource extraction in Africa, Ferguson (2005: 378) argued 'this economic investment has been concentrated in secured enclaves, often with little or no economic benefit to the wider society'.
According to Ferguson, these projects are ring-fenced in terms of how the finance is allocated right through to production compounds. However, enclaves are much 'leakier' than Ferguson envisages and these infrastructure projects are simultaneously locally enclaved, but also connected to national level political processes of access and rent extraction, as well as being transnationalised through diplomacy, financing, and supply chains.
An important aspect of this complex territorialisation is the relationship between enclaved infrastructure projects in non-urban areas and their connections to urban areas. These connections derive from the fact consumption of energy in global South cities is based on networks of infrastructure linking to non-urban spaces of production (Mavhunga, 2013) . Urban infrastructure necessarily enrolls nominally 'rural' or, in the case of off-shore oil and gas, maritime spaces (Appel, 2012) . This reflects Brenner's (2013: 167) idea of 'extended urbanization' involving the 'operationalization of places, territories and landscapes, often located far beyond the dense population centers, to support the everyday activities and socioeconomic dynamics of urban life'. These infrastructure networks, such as processing plants, pipelines or cables traverse rural spaces to reach urban areas which often entails dispossession of rural populations.
Agency
Such networked territories require sovereign states to provide the necessary 'social infrastructure' wherein ruling elites create the conditions for the international mobility of capital, which requires granting access to resources and land. Elsewhere (Mohan and Lampert, 2013) we have argued that the agency of actors in those countries where 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 the Chinese invest can shape and channel the nature and uses of this investment.
While political agency lies in both state and non-state actors and is exercised in official and unofficial ways (Hagmann and Peclard, 2010 
CHINA'S MERCANTILIST GEOECONOMICS
Given that geoeconomic control plays a critical role in China's foreign policy we argue that China's international infrastructure projects defy a simple statist logic since there are commercial considerations playing into them. The model is more a mercantilist one where the Chinese state supports commercial ventures without necessarily steering them.
China's internationalisation
In understanding China's expansionary logic, the country's 'state-orchestrated market capitalism' (Ayers, 2013) has produced consistently high growth for two decades, but (Dunning and Lundan, 2008) . In China's case the first two predominate and are tied to a diplomatic agenda that bundles resource-seeking FDI (e.g. energy, minerals) with market-seeking FDI (e.g. infrastructure contracts) through complex packages which may include an element of aid (Power et al, 2012) . While the types of contracts adopted by Chinese firms vary, the most relevant here are 'EPC' (Engineering, Procurement and Construction) contracts that circumscribe the obligations of the contractors and contrast with longer-term commitments through 'BOT' (Build, Operate and Transfer) contracts increasingly used in Public-Private Partnerships (OECD, 2014) . On the The literature on infrastructure financing in developed economies discusses how the financiers and projects have effectively taken politics out of the discussion (Ashton et al, 2016) . In China's engagements with LMICs it practices a public discourse of 'noninterference', which refers to the respect China has for their sovereignty. This is used as something of a brand insofar as the Chinese deploy this discourse to distance themselves from the negative interference practiced by western states over decades.
However, the power relations between China and these 'partners' are rarely even and while espousing a lack of political interference China attaches commercial conditions to its loans. An upshot of this approach to lending is that consideration of labour rights, environmental standards, and local content can be overlooked although things are changing. For example, environmental and social impact assessments (ESIAs)
were not obligatory for Chinese-funded projects which became problematic (Grimsditch, 2012; Validakis, 2014) . Some banks and contractors increasingly do now carry out ESIAs, not least because infrastructure financing often enrolls nonChinese financiers who insist on such assessments (AIIB, 2016). For example, in mid-
ExIm Bank issued 'Guidance for the Environmental and Social Impact
Assessment of Chinese Export and Import Bank's Loan Projects' which require an ESIA both prior to and after project completion. Likewise, many Chinese firms do not recognize labour unions, though they do formally abide by local laws so whether these are honoured comes down to local mobilization and willingness to regulate (Haglund, 2009 ).
Chinese Financing
As Aglietta and Bai (2013: 5) note 'Finance is a tool of political power that China can use in protecting its domestic economy, in securing its supply lines, and in acquiring critical technology'. Access to credit is one of the key ways that China has entered the infrastructure construction market, and this particularly Asian mode of financing distinguishes Chinese investments from those undertaken by Western construction companies. As Brautigam (2010: 180) notes 'In the pattern followed by Japan, Korea and Taiwan, the Chinese use bank finance far more than stock markets to provide capital to their companies. This allows for the guiding hand of government to provide an extra boost to companies' overseas efforts'. This 'guiding hand' refers to the hybridity of both China's state/private entities and its geopolitical/geoeconomic strategies.
The involvement of state-owned banks over private or multilateral banks promotes an alternative financing model that may be beneficial for developing economies, because a 'different capital risk model is being constructed that is calculated differently to traditional (western) investors...capital is invested in a manner that is arguably more suited to the long-term development needs of developing economies and does not chase a short term return on investment' (Davies, 2010: 11) . This approach has a higher tolerance to risk because of its political underpinning by the Chinese state. For example, concessional loans have a long maturity (typically 20 years) with a grace period of up to 7 years where no interest is paid. The interest rates are subsidised and underwritten by MOFCOM which allows the banks to lend at lower rates but are effectively reimbursed by the Chinese state. Such financing is used in energy and extractive industries where long lead times exist for commercialisation and where offtaker agreements -an agreement between a producer and a buyer to buy/sell a certain amount of the future production -can be put in place to ensure repayment over a long period. However, the case studies we examine suggest that Davies' claim that this is necessarily 'more suited' to local needs begs the question of whose local needs are being met.
Most important for financing are the policy banks (Downs, 2011) , notably China ExIm Bank and China Development Bank (CDB) with the former focusing on infrastructure development in Africa and the latter driven more by commercial imperatives (Sanderson and Forsythe, 2013 Chinese businesses via loans to foreign buyers who want to purchase Chinese-made goods. The bank is responsible for loans for infrastructure which are generally, although not always, regarded as partly concessional. Africa is the focus of ExIm's dealings, with more than 80% of its loans going to resource rich African countries, the resources acting as collateral for the loans. Most widely publicized has been the socalled 'Angola mode' (Power et al, 2012) which is an oil for infrastructure deal that was first pioneered in Angola, though has existed among non-Chinese lenders and in 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 other countries beforehand. A condition of these loans is that the infrastructure is constructed by a Chinese SOE so that while the nominal client or beneficiary is the local government, most of the money never leaves China and simply passes from bank to engineering SOE. As such the wider linkages for recipient countries may be limited because the Chinese contractor uses predominantly Chinese supply chains, but on the other hand the model reduces the risk of corruption within the beneficiary state and, crucially, speeds through the delivery of the infrastructure which is why Chinese involvement is generally well-received in the global South (Corkin, 2013) . Hence, the Bank is not merely developmental, but also creates a market for Chinese goods and services. The CDB has focused its international lending on Latin America and Africa.
The bank is fully owned by the Chinese government which implicitly guarantees its debt, enabling it to provide lower interest rates and longer-term loans than other
Chinese banks (Kamal and Gallagher, 2016) .
SOUTH-SOUTH INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
According to McKinsey (2016) and Chinese SOEs are responding to demand in these markets. Our knowledge of these complex geoeconomic processes is still quite black-boxed and understanding them is best achieved through case studies, to which we now turn.
Data for our case studies was collected through two projects; one examined large Chinese-backed dams in LMICs (focusing on Ghana, Nigeria, Cambodia, and Malaysia) and the other China's engagement with African oil producers (focusing on Ghana, Nigeria, and Sudan). As distinct research projects, they did not share a methodology but both broadly adopted a value chain approach which tracked through from the motives of Chinese actors to the mechanisms for engaging in LMICs, and on to the outcomes for local development. Both projects took a case study approach of particular infrastructure deals and then 'process traced' these over time, though data on the details of loan agreements and contracts was partial. Data collection was largely qualitative in interviewing key-decision makers on the Chinese and LMIC sides, local NGOs, and project-affected communities.
The two cases from these research projects reflect different dynamics between geoeconomics, territory and domestic agency. Despite very different political systems both cases demonstrate the power of China's finance and relative weakness of recipient states as well as how rural communities are affected by energy production for urban areas. Yet they reveal differences, with Ghana's elite contesting the ways in which oil could be collateralized to secure Chinese finance while the repayment plans were affected by changing oil prices against which the loans were guaranteed.
Cambodia is strategically important for China in the SE Asia region with close ties between Chinese and Cambodian elites. This meant the loan negotiations were untransparent and decisions were forced through against due diligence processes.
China in Ghana's energy projects
The case of Ghana's Atuabo gas processing plant demonstrates China's geoeconomic power in offering large resource-backed bank loans tied to the use of Chinese construction firms. It also reveals how the gas plant connected the enclaved space of offshore oil production to the land and so displaced rural producers in order to create a facility that generated electricity for Ghana's cities. This loan also revealed elite agency in contesting how the benefits from investment would be distributed while the changing oil price undermined the terms of China's loan although it has been the Ghanaian government that suffered most from this shift in the loan terms.
China has engaged in Ghana's energy infrastructure in a number of ways, notably the hydroelectric dam at Bui, which we discussed at the start, and the gas processing plant. The gas processing plant was financed by the CDB and built by the Chinese NOC, Sinopec, in Ghana's Western Region between 2011 and 2015. The plant treats raw gas from the offshore Jubilee Field in order to produce fuel grade gas for the Aboadze power station. The plan is to boost Ghana's electricity supply by 1,000 megawatts and produce valuable by-products such as liquefied gas and condensate.
Ghana's oil was discovered offshore in 2007 and since production started in 2010, the Jubilee Field has produced an average of 100,000 barrels per day which is divided across 17 contract areas. Since the Jubilee Field came into operation two new fields are being developed; the Tweneboa-Enyenra-Ntomme (TEN) operated by Tullow and Sankofa operated by ENI. These two additional discoveries come with associated gas and Ghana is expected to get between 90-180 million standard cubic feet per day (mmscfd) from Jubilee and TEN, and 150-180 mmscfd from Sankofa. For a country dependent on oil imports and a massively over-stretched energy infrastructure the oil find was great news (Mohan et al, 2018) and on the back of it the Government of Ghana began negotiations with Asian governments for some sort of oil for infrastructure deal. In September 2010, the Chinese offered the Ghana Government a $3 billion Master Facility Agreement (MFA) on a non-concessional basis through the CDB (Hardus, 2017) . This loan facility was dedicated to the Western Corridor Gas Infrastructure Development Project 2 and was split into two equal tranches of $1.5
billion each with slightly different terms, as set out in Table 1 . The geoeconomic logic of this loan was to use China's foreign exchange for productive purposes and hopefully yield a return, to gain access to Ghana's oil, and create a market for Chinese oil engineering firms; with the latter possibly competing for other opportunities in Ghana's hydrocarbon sector (Moreira, 2013) . The loan arrangement is not unlike the Angola mode, whereby repayment is through UNIPEC, a wholly-owned subsidiary to Sinopec, which acquired an off-taker agreement to lift 13,000 barrels of crude oil daily for fifteen-and-a-half years to repay the loan. Sinopec secured the contract to construct the gas infrastructure under a $750 million subsidiary agreement. Territorially, the pipeline bringing gas onshore and onwards into the electricity grid reveals the interconnectedness of infrastructures and how a quintessentially enclaved facility, the offshore rig, links to material and political processes (Appel, 2012) in both fixed state territories (electricity production and sales, tax revenue, etc.) but also in transnational networks (Chinese oil companies and supply chains, Chinese banks, etc.
>>
). Yet the benefits of this electricity infrastructure are not evenly shared. Ghana's electrification, as with patterns across Africa, shows a major urban bias with 85% of urban households having access to electricity, compared to 40% of rural households (Kemausuor and Ackom, 2017 ). The gas plant and the pipeline, in particular, affected farmers. Our interviews showed some received scant compensation for crops, though many did not, and none received compensation for the land that was taken: "I have not seen anything….they even took their farmlands and promised compensations were not paid" (Anokyi village, Oct 2016); "our farms that harbors the pipeline, we have not received any money for compensation" (Asem Nda village, Oct 2016); "We felt cheated and took the matter to court but got to no avail" (Mampong, Nov 2016).
In terms of political agency the loan became entangled with domestic Ghanaian politics. In Ghana, there are two main parties that vie for elections and have held power since the return to multi-party democracy in 1992. They are the National Democratic Congress (NDC) which professes to be social democratic and the more market oriented New Patriotic Party (NPP) although the ideological divisions between them are not huge (Whitfield, 2011 with a lot of strings…we find it easier to go to the BRIC countries" (Bloomberg, 2012) Regarding the absence of 'strings', Chen (2016: 2) notes the EPC contract offered to Sinopec 'provided the Ghanaians with an easy all-inclusive deal that obviated the need to conduct laborious and independent stages of tendering and financing negotiations'. Yet the deal was seen to be one-sided with UNIPEC getting assured supplies yet no commitments were asked of the Chinese partners, and in line with most other Chinese loans 60% of inputs (see Table 1 ) come from China which goes against Ghana's Local Content law.
The loan agreement and the collateralization of oil became the focus of political contestation. Shortly after oil was discovered the Ghana government began drafting new oil and gas legislation, notably the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA), which sought to establish how oil revenues would be used for national development. When it came to the design of the PRMA, the NDC favoured immediate use of oil rents to finance development as opposed to saving for the future. The NPP opposed collateralisation, seeing it as 'nothing more than eating your dinner and lunch at breakfast time' (Hansard, 9 December 2010, Col 2820). Eventually, the NPP opposition softened their stance by not arguing against collateralisation per se, but rather the extent of it, which became passed into law. Such behavior by the NDC was less about a vision for development and more about the short-term need to secure an election victory.
This short-termism was also reflected in the NDC's decision to use the oil for infrastructure loan to help develop Ghana's domestic gas industry. As one official argued:
'The initial thought was the producers of the gas [Jubilee Partners] to commercialise it. But the [NDC] government negotiated during the plan of development that they wanted to be given first right of refusal on utilizing it [the gas]' (Interview, Senior Ghana Gas Official, July 2014).
The NPP later revealed that the World Bank was also willing to offer a concessional loan for developing the gas infrastructure. However, the NDC wanted the financing an incumbent regime in an attempt to win fiercely contested elections (Mohan et al, 2018) .
One upshot of using oil as collateral has been the rise in national debt, which rose sharply under the NDC from $5 billion to over $10 billion such that the debt to GDP ratio doubled from around 35% in 2009 to 70% in 2014. The dangers of using oil as collateral were revealed over the summer of 2014 when it was announced that only half of the $3 billion loan would be used, and of the 12 projects only 2 were implemented -the gas plant and an ICT project. The issue was the price of oil that was agreed to re-pay the loan. Not only had the Government of Ghana paid high commitment fees (see Table 1 ), but the Ghanaians were working on a fixed rate of Ghana's engagement with the Chinese around energy infrastructure shows that China's geoeconomic agenda concerned accessing oil through oil-backed infrastructure loans while ensuring construction contracts came to its NOCs. The gas plant brought the enclaved oil production facility onto the Ghana's land-based territory and with it dispossessed rural farmers in the name of the national good whereas electricity flows mainly to urban centres. While Ghanaian elites exercised some agency, the intense inter-party rivalry undermined the stability needed for longterm planning around major infrastructure projects. The changing oil price and the collapse of the original loan showed that the commercial conditions attached to such loans means that China remained relatively insulated from the risk of non-payment while the Ghanaian Government was left with limited infrastructure and residual debt. However, the loan is commercial and structured around a long-term concession to supply urban Cambodians with electricity. It also demonstrates that where domestic elites are drawn into such bargains with powerful international actors they largely ignore due process or the needs of project-affected communities.
Given the wars that were fought between the late 1960s and early 1990s Cambodia's infrastructure is comparatively underdeveloped with energy a priority. The Kamchay
Dam has a generating capacity of 193MW and its annual output is 498GWh (NGO 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 government was keen to attract investment into the energy sector and the Chinese are one of the country's leading investors. The Kamchay Dam is the highest profile of 6
Chinese backed dam projects in Cambodia and was negotiated at the top political level which reflects a growing geopolitical alliance between the two countries, and subsequently affected a range of regulatory issues. A key factor in the geopolitics of China's aid and investment strategies is a recipient country's support for its 'One China' policy which relates to China's territorial claims over Taiwan. Countries that recognize China's claims are more likely to receive investment (Sun, 2014) .
According to one NGO respondent such calculi were at play in the Kamchay Dam:
China also provided 600 million dollars because at that time the government 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Sinohydro whereby compensation would be paid by the Cambodian government if the project faced difficulties or under-performs. Some law-makers rejected the guarantee package because they had not actually seen the terms of the contract while the 44-year lease is much longer than similar arrangements that are normally 25-30 years and which will benefit the Chinese in terms of long-term profits. Although Sinohydro and the energy off-taker, Electricité Du Cambodge, will not reveal the price of electricity to 920 Riel per kWh, this is still too high and many people do not have the money to connect to the grid, which requires a fee of US$160 per household.
The Bokor National Park, where the Kamchay Dam is located, is an extension of the Cardamom Mountains. 2,015 ha of protected forest were lost due to the flooding for the reservoir and a total area of 2,291 ha was destroyed (Grimsditch, 2012) . As the dam was located in a national park, no resettlement was required, because there were no villages located upstream of the dam. However, the flooded area was mixed bamboo forest, which provided raw materials for basket-making, rattan and wild fruits, which contributed to the livelihoods of the poorer families located downstream.
Our research (Siciliano et al, 2016) showed the livelihoods of these villagers was negatively affected by the dam and that no compensation was paid. Crucially, the 'tied' to the use of Chinese SOEs for construction. This packaging of finance and construction allowed for quick disbursement of funds which both the Chinese and the recipients prefer and enables them to out-manoeuvre more 'traditional' lenders like the World Bank who, as we saw in the Ghana case, were prepared to fund the gas processing plant. Geoeconomically the outcomes might be described as 'win, win, win' for the Chinese, because their loans are repaid, in the case of Ghana (and other resource-backed loans) they gain access to the oil, and the engineering SOEs secure contracts for overseas projects where China's domestic market is saturated. Despite these geoeconomic interests there are still geopolitical agendas at play, notably the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 role China plays as a regional hegemon in South East Asia, as well as recipient countries' support for the One China Policy.
Territorially, the infrastructure projects are spatially quite enclaved, yet these spaces of company operation are linked in complex ways to national and transnational actors, which defy a state-based logic. The gas infrastructure in Ghana was an EPC contract with high levels of Chinese inputs which undermine efforts to boost the local content of inward investment projects (Ovadia, 2016) . The gas plant acts as a conduit between offshore hydrocarbon production, involving international and Ghanaian oil companies, and domestic electricity markets. The current proposal to extend the original Chinese loan against future gas sales for liquefaction and export further complicates these connections. The Kamchay Dam was a BOT contract which secures an operating concession for 44 years and thus guarantees a stable revenue stream for the Chinese operator, free from competition.
While geoeconomic relations need not be territorialized (Sassen, 2017) , with fixed infrastructures some control of territory is a necessity -rather than a 'tactical option' in Cowen and Smith's terms -which entails displacement of local populations. The paper showed that in both projects, which are located in rural areas, the electricity they generated largely supplied urban areas, which cements spatial inequalities despite the recipient state's rhetoric of increasing access to affordable power. In Ghana, farmers' land was lost to make way for pipelines and in Cambodia forest users were negatively impacted by the dam's inundation. While these infrastructure projects are brokered bilaterally between political elites wherein global South actors do have agency, such agency is constrained. The official discourse of both sides serves to 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 depoliticize these relations by framing them as 'co-operation' yet the conditions set by China, such as loan repayment terms and content requirements, favour the Chinese. The risks for both sides from resource-backed loans was evident in the Ghana case where the falling oil price precipitated the Chinese cancelling 2/3 of the loan which hurt the Ghana Government more than it did CDB. In terms of repayment of the loan for the Kamchay Dam the BOT lease is one of the first of its kind entered into by China and its long duration certainly seems to favour the Chinese financiers and engineering SOEs.
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